Metropolitan Governance Background Study: What Do We Need to Know?

A Rapid Foray Into Operational Concerns

Literature Review

Gérard Divay and Jeanne M. Wolfe
with the collaboration of Mario Polèse
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Work prepared for the World Bank

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The equitable management of metropolitan areas, whether in the developed or developing world, is one of the most challenging issues of our times. Today, about 400 urban areas have populations of over one million, and it is estimated that by 2025, there will be more than 500. Urban centres contribute to national economies in far greater proportion than their population share, and are the engines of enterprise, innovation, and culture (Scott 2001b, Polèse and Stren 2000, Ruland & Ladavalya 1996). They also suffer from pollution, congestion, poverty, crime, unemployment, housing and infrastructure deficiencies, squalid patterns of development, and an extraordinary melange of bewildering governmental jurisdictions which makes planning difficult.

The purpose of this review is to identify key issues in the governance of large urban areas through a questioning of the literature. Governance is understood to mean the total sum of decisions and actions that are necessary to make a metropolitan area functional and livable. Broadly, it involves not only formal government structures, but also the entrepreneurial classes, the social and educational sectors, NGOs, CBOs, cultural groups, professional and recreational associations, residents – in fact the whole gamut of civil society (Jouve & Lefèvre 1999).

This review focuses on metropolitan issues, not urban issues in general; but rather those problems that can best be tackled at a metropolitan scale to overcome the problems ascribed to jurisdictional fragmentation. Most metropolitan areas consist of a densely developed core city surrounded by suburbs that are engulfing smaller urban centers and villages, sprawling out into the rural areas along transportation routes, and sprouting industries, commercial activities and housing in a seemingly random fashion. They are usually made up of many local governments, often of wildly differing size, population and organizing capacity.

A second focus of this paper is metropolitan decision-making for collective goods. Area wide decisions involve complex systems of actors, and a huge variety of actions. Collective goods and services are those enjoyed or used by the population at large: infrastructure, economic, social and cultural development facilities, and environmental protection. Also known as public goods, or joint consumption goods, these are needs that are "non-subtractable", as everyone requires them. Roads and sewers are such an example. However, the interest is in more than equipment and services as such, it is in the ultimate outcomes of their presence: fluid traffic movements for instance, or high levels of public health.

Following this line of enquiry, the third focus is an attempt to understand how the outcomes relate to, or are influenced by, metropolitan decision-making structures and processes. This is a most challenging task, since there are very few analytical attempts at the evaluation of results except on a programmatic basis. While there has been a fair number of comparative studies on a single service such as transportation or water supply, there are very few attempts to look in detail at overall outcomes. The precise mechanisms of decision-making at the metropolitan level are virtually unexplored territory.

This paper is divided into six sections. The first provides background and sets the stage for what is to follow. It introduces basic notions on the definitions and classification of metropolitan regions and governing agencies, illuminates the government-governance debate, and reviews criteria for evaluating good governance. The subsequent literature review is then structured around five questions in an attempt to understand the issues, the varieties, the decision-making processes and
the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary thinking about metro governance, and its relationship with national or state government on the one hand and local (municipal) government on the other. These questions are: 1) What should be specifically decided at metropolitan levels? 2) Which primary policies at various levels are influencing overall outcomes? 3) What are the appropriate decision-making processes for metropolitan issues to ensure both vertical and horizontal collaboration? 4) How do institutional arrangements at the metropolitan level influence the decision-making processes and the overall outcomes? 5) How do specific sectoral interventions interrelate with the overall outcomes? Each is illustrated by examples, so far as is possible. The responses to these questions are of course inter-related and overlapping.

The five questions posed are rarely addressed directly in the research literature, although many are the subject of extensive polemic. This means that the approach to answers are largely interpretations of studies undertaken to analyse other issues. Nevertheless the five questions are essential to the understanding of collective action at the metropolitan level and are suggested as guideposts to further research.

BACKGROUND

Definitions

The definition of metropolitan areas and metropolitan institutions is extremely variable, and is subject to change as populations grow and formal institutions proliferate. They may be classified according to their spatial form, their special identifying characteristics or their institutional configuration.

Spatially, metropolitan areas are usually defined by the extent of the urban area and its immediate surrounds. Broadly there are three approaches to territorial definition. The first is the contiguous area of urbanization, in which one would expect to find the full range of urban services, water, sewer, a complete road network and the like. Examples are, Calgary or Singapore. A second approach is to define the functional metropolitan area – this is the approach often used by geographers and census takers – and involves consideration of size, population density and commuter-shed or common labour market. In the sixties and seventies the arguments for metropolitan government were based on the need to create structures to fit their social and physical development (US Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations 1964). A third approach is that of the so-called “new regionalists”, who consider city-regions as the basic building block toward new forms of governance (Savitch and Vogel 2000, Norris 2001, Wheeler 2002). The dramatic resurgence of interest in city-regions since the early 1990’s replaces the concept of Megalopolis, a term coined by Jean Gottman (1961), to describe metropolitan growth and the fusing of metropolitan regions along the eastern seaboard of the United States. In Gottman’s (1979:6) own words, “Megalopolis is a spectacular and fascinating phenomenon. Facts so huge and stubborn can only be caused by the convergence of many powerful and sustained forces”.

Some definitions contain classificatory elements, such as port-city, capital city, industrial city, tourist city, but most metro areas are not subject to uni-variable analysis. By definition they are complex. Another example is the typology suggested by Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) based on growth characteristics. Here cities are divided into three classes, the city of hypergrowth, the city of dynamism and the mature city. Hypergrowth, typified by the cities of Southeast Asia, implies high rates of population increase, a young population structure, large numbers of people seeking entry into the labour force, enormous stresses on housing, social and educational services, land and infrastructure. Dynamic cities are in demographic transition, birth rates have begun to slow down with increasing urbanization, and urban services are beginning to catch up with demand. Mature developed cities, characterized by those of Western Europe and North America, are those with an aging population profile, in which birth rates are below replacement levels, and immigration is necessary to maintain growth, and fill low-skilled jobs.

Metropolitan government institutions are usually classified according to their completeness in range of power and duties and territorial extent. A complete metropolitan government consisting of a federation of municipalities, or an intermediate tier of government, such as espoused in the sixties and seventies is considered to have the following characteristics: political legitimacy, including direct elections, meaningful autonomy, including no interference from other levels of government, adequate finance, wide ranging jurisdiction, and a reasonable territorial extent. (Sharpe 1995). Examples include Tokyo and Toronto before amalgamation, and the uni-cities of Singapore and Johannesburg. Variants are legion. Some metro councils are elected indirectly, named by member municipalities, or appointed by senior levels of government. Some have over-riding powers, others are voluntary associations, such as the Councils of Government (COGs) in the United States. Another way of addressing metropolitan service delivery is through special purpose agencies, such as transportation commissions, water boards, or housing authorities. Yet another way is through inter-municipal agreements, either to provide services jointly, for instance in fire protection or waste management, or for a larger municipality to provide services for a smaller one, for instance in library or recreational services; for example, municipalities in Quebec. Many metropolitan areas have few or no formal metropolitan structures.

For the United States, Savitch and Vogel (1996:13) have demonstrated the range of options by portraying formal institutions as a continuum, going through from comprehensive metropolitan governments to mutual adjustment strategies to no formal structure.

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<th>A Continuum of Regional Institutions</th>
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Government or Governance?

Metropolitan governance, as it has come to be known, is however, not limited to formal institutions. There are multiple definitions of the term: Rhodes (1996) has identified six. In general, governance involves multiple stakeholders, interdependent resources and actions, and shared purposes and blurred boundaries between the public and private, formal and informal, state and civil society sectors. This undoubtedly requires a greater need for coordination, negotiating and building consensus (UNCHS 2000:57).

The growth of the use of the term governance is an outcome of several factors: 1) a better understanding of how governments work; 2) the neo-liberal swing in the 1980s towards privatization, partnerships, and deregulation which means that many more actors are now involved in service provision; 3) in the U.S. the reluctance of politicians to address problematic governmental processes (a placebo effect) and 4) a lack of public funds available to finance major urban structures (a focus on governance requires significantly less public sector investment).

Prompted largely by globalization, the emergence of the “new regionalism” school of thought promotes the idea that city-regions are the only vehicle to take advantage and reap the economic benefits of the new economic order. It is argued that competition with other regions will force fragmented areas to work together and seek out strategic alliances in order to maintain their own economic self-interest. (Keating 1998, Orfield 1997, Savitch and Vogel 2000). The governance of such regions would depend much more on voluntary methods of encouraging local-government cooperation, would equitably address the negative externalities resulting from fragmented governmental structures, and provide fiscal help to impoverished central cities so that they may contribute more positively to the regional economy (Norris 2001).

The new regionalism puts the emphasis on, coordination between the various levels of government, (Savitch and Vogel 1996), relationships between government and civil society (McCarney 1996), and relationships between all the various sectors of society (Scott 2001a). The UNCHS (2001:57) gives a very succinct generic definition of their concept of governance, namely “Coordinating, Steering, Integrating”.

The new dimension in contemporary approaches to the study of city regions, compared to those of the sixties and seventies, is clearly the addition of the economic argument. But as Frisken and Norris (2001:468) ask, will the economic imperative be “compelling enough to overcome the political obstacles” that have long dogged the establishment of reformist solutions? In the provision of urban public goods, especially in North America, there are two major opposing schools of thought. First, is the public choice school that believes that public goods and services are most efficiently provided by local municipalities, and that if people do not like them they can “vote with their feet” (move house) (Tiebout 1956, Ostrom and Ostrom 2000). Second are the reformers or consolidators who see efficiency and equity in area-wide services and support metropolitan governance (Visser 2002). Political opposition to metropolitan authorities or to the amalgamation of small municipalities comes from the public choice school who argue that services can be provided more cheaply and more sensitively at the local level.
However, regardless of both the public choice advocates and the aspirations of the proponents of regionalism, decisions are made on the provision of collective goods in metropolitan contexts whatever the institutional arrangements. The UNCHS (2001:211), recognizes that “Good urban governance is not merely a matter of efficient management; it also has political dimensions related to democracy, human rights and civic participation in decision-making processes”. This definition emphasizes the values, standards and processes, as well as the institutions by which citizens and governments interact. The accent is resolutely put on the taking of decisions, and not merely on institutional structures.

Governance is thus interpreted as a coordination process consisting of formal, institutional mechanisms and a plethora of strategic alliances and informal mechanisms that all contribute to the management of metropolitan areas. Far from the traditional model of a command and control government, it is now recognized that metropolitan governance is a consensus building mechanism of extraordinary complexity (Lefèvre 1998). The identification of the decision-making actors, agencies, coalitions and power-groups and their relative influence and interaction is essential to understand metropolitan dynamics.

Criteria for Good Governance:

These considerations lead into the question of what are the criteria for good governance? Klink (2002), following Bourne (1999) has briskly listed three: efficiency, (economies of scale, territorial spill-overs), equity (redistribution), and voice (flexibility, accessibility, and accountability). This type of approach is usually translated into normative terms, listing goals, general principles, criteria, or indicators that may or may not be measurable.

The UNCHS (Habitat) (2000) has prepared an expanded list of goals, along with their operational components and the means and methods of achieving them, shown on the following page. (It will be noted that economic development and job creation are not among them).

Another approach is that of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999:5) who have elaborated a series of indicators to evaluate the quality of government focussing on political realities. These are grouped into six clusters, 1) Voice and Accountability, (encompassing the political process, political rights and civil liberties, 2) Political Stability, 3) Government effectiveness, (the quality of services, and of the civil service), 4) Regulatory quality 5) the Rule of Law, and 6) Control of Corruption. Measurement is made largely through qualitative surveys, which in themselves, present many theoretical and practical problems. It will be noted that only point 3, Effectiveness, attempts to address the traditional concerns of benefit-cost analysis in the provision of services.
<table>
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<th>Normative Goals, Means and Methods for the Inclusive City</th>
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<td><strong>Normative Goals</strong></td>
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<td>Decentralization and participatory democracy</td>
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<td>Building democratic culture</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
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<td>Administration and service delivery</td>
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<td>Efficient investment in infrastructure</td>
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UNCHS (Habitat), 2000
The World Bank has proposed the enduring principles of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, stability and participation. The UNHCS Best Practices Database incorporates measures of ex-post project evaluation to produce a list of eight principles, of which one is subsidiarity and another economic development. (http://www.bestpractices.org/)

Other compilations of criteria tend to respond to the approaches and values of their proponents. For instance the urban consolidationists stress efficiency, economies of scale and equity, the public choice school emphasizes sensitiveness to local area decision-making and public participation, while the environmentalists concentrate on measures of sustainable development, political ecology and performance indices (Bartone, Bernstein, Leitman and Eigen 1994).

The eleven criteria, or rather, the principals of good metropolitan government listed by the OECD (2001) are both process oriented (Cities for Citizens, Coherence in Policy, Coordination, Participation, Flexibility) and substantive (Endogenous Development, Efficient Financial Management, Particularity, Social Cohesion, Subsidiarity, Sustainability).

John Friedmann (1998:20) through his reflections upon the nature of the good society, has prepared a series of criteria divided into three groups, good governance, good management and good outcomes. In other words he imagines a city with an open political process, well run, with a high level of services.

### Criteria for the Good City

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<th>Criteria of Good City Governance</th>
<th>Criteria of Good City Management</th>
<th>Criteria of Good City Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Inspired political leadership</td>
<td>Accessibility, transparency,</td>
<td>A productive city</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public accountability</td>
<td>responsiveness</td>
<td>A sustainable city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>A liveable city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>An actively tolerant city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>A caring city</td>
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Friedmann 1998:20

*Good city governance* refers to the political process of allotting resources and “steering” the collective life of the political community. It involves the triad of state, market and civil society joined in various forms of collaborative local action. *Good city management* concerns the administration and use of common resources in bringing about those minimal conditions of urban life that nurture human flourishing. Finally, *good city outcomes* concern those which further the common good of the city, including the strengthening of good governance, thereby completing the circle. (Friedmann 1998:20).

This conceptualization is perhaps most helpful in that it recognizes, and puts up front, the process sequence of, political choice, administration and management, and quality of life outcomes. Most of the metropolitan-based literature focuses only on the managerial. An expanded list of these criteria is shown in appendix 1 along with possible measurement indicators.
On Competitiveness: What does it mean?

Competitiveness in relationship to urban development is widely used in all sorts of contexts: at the global, regional, metropolitan, and local scales, in economic development, and in the production and delivery of urban services. (http://www.vrm.ca/biblio_competitite) In the literature on contracting out and privatisation, it is considered a virtue.

At the global level, competitive cities are those that occupy “control and command” positions in the world economy of the information age. These cities were identified by Sassen (1991), as New York, London and Tokyo. Since then, the relative importance of a large number of centers has been ranked by variables such as, number of financial institutions, head offices of transnational corporations, international agencies, stock and commodity exchanges, labour force and the like. City-boosters want their city to be “world-class.” Clearly most cities never will be.

The new regionalists promote their agenda on the basis of competition (e.g., Dodge 1996, Pierce, Johnson and Hall 1993, Rusk 1995, Savitch and Vogel 2000). If cities are to be competitive, that is to say, economically competitive, then new governance structures are required for cohesive management. However, the model for the new forms of governance, state, market and civil society, is based on co-operation, collegiality and consensus; a wonderful contradiction.

At the local government level, the public choice advocates (Ostrom & Ostrom 2000) see competition between small municipalities as the major force in keeping service costs, and thus taxation, low and promoting choice. But the cult of individualism does not promote social cohesion.

In terms of economic development, cooperation in metropolitan management is urged, so that economic development can be well planned and region-wide strategies worked out to attract business and industry, and create jobs (Dodge 1996). On the other hand, the competitiveness of business enterprises with each other is well known. There is evidence that area-wide planning and promotion as envisaged, favours transnationals and large-scale enterprises to the detriment of small, locally based activities, an unsustainable proposition. Douglass 1995, Dharmapatni and Firman 1975).

The provision of collective goods, it is claimed by some, is more efficient if produced by the private sector because in the unbundling of natural monopolies, competition can be introduced (Roth 1987, Guislain 1995).

Decentralisation and Metropolitanisation: a paradox?

Since the early seventies, decentralisation of government functions has been one of the mainstays of public policy in the developing world. It has been promoted by national governments, NGOs, international organisations, aid agencies, and social activists, as being the most effective tool to manage development problems (Rondinelli 1998). It has been described as the devolution of power, responsibilities, resources and legitimacy, to regions, municipalities, communities, and CBOs, both as a response to perceived central government failure, and as an enabling mechanism to help people help themselves (Campbell 1996). Decentralisation and the strengthening of local
authorities are mandated by the Habitat Agenda and the Local Agenda 21, as worked out in Istanbul in 1996.

At the same time, many observers subscribe to the principal of subsidiary: that is that things work best at the smallest scale at which they can operate effectively (Hall and Pfeiffer 2000:165). This is the doctrine of the OCDE (2001) and the European Union for example (Barnett 1997), and this why most observers propose “light”, not heavy handed metropolitan governance structures.

How does all this fit with the agenda of the metropolitan reformers and new regionalists? Is it assumed that the new interest in metropolitan governance is a manifestation of decentralisation from central governments, or, as the consolidationists assert, a re-grouping of local interests? From having embraced decentralisation, is re-centralisation, albeit in a different form, now being espoused?

The literature is remarkably silent on this issue: it is largely swept under the carpet.

1. WHAT HAS TO BE DECIDED AT THE METROPOLITAN LEVEL?

Most proponents of metropolitan government suggest that services and functions which are supra-local be provided at the metropolitan level. There is broad agreement in the literature that these include transportation and broad-brush spatial planning, environmental infrastructure, namely water and sewer systems and waste management, economic and social development, along with cost-sharing fiscal arrangements, and are usually argued on grounds of efficiency, equity, economy of scale, and functional catchment area (Brennan 1995). However, in order to understand their justification, it is useful to look at the range of problems they are addressing, since clearly metropolitan governance must respond to basic metropolitan issues, those that are not solvable at the national scale.

Basic metropolitan issues:

Most sprawling urban regions, particularly in the developing world, are plagued by large-scale poverty, a lack of basic services in many areas, environmental degradation, malfunctioning development patterns, growing crime rates and corruption. Poverty condemns large segments of the population to non-serviced informal settlements, a downward spiral of marginalization, and social and economic exclusion, and particularly affects women and children. Poverty fuels ethnic and racial tensions contributing to violence and crime. The disparities between nations, and between cities even in the same nation are enormous, and are reflected within urban areas, causing many observers to speak of a “two tier” economy, the have and the have nots (Ainstein 1996, Mitlin 2002). Thus, while a city-region can have a growing economy, and a world-stage player, a vast proportion of its population remains poor, a proportion that is growing in both the developing world and the industrialised nations. (Nye and Donahue 2000:15) (Sassen 1994). Perlman has noted that the difference in a squatter settlement she studied thirty years ago and today, is that residents have lost hope.
Economic development in most metropolitan areas is very uneven, and job creation in the formal sector has been disappointing (Fainstein 2001). The new regionalism in a global context has not brought prosperity to the masses, despite the vigour of the transnationals. Most urban regions have no economic development strategy, either in terms of promotion of enterprise or development of entrepreneurship, much less spatial planning. Government incentives tend to be at the senior levels, and aspatial.

Transportation and basic infrastructure systems have not kept pace with urban growth, further disadvantaging the poor. Road systems are piecemeal, grossly overloaded, and under-maintained, while the number of motorised vehicle increases at extraordinary rates (World Bank 2001, Figueroa 1996). Public transportation, which tends to be fragmented between public authorities and a myriad of private carriers, cannot extend to many of the impoverished settlements because the quality of roads is so bad. People are thus excluded from getting to work if it were available, not to mention children going to school, mothers getting their children to clinics and the like.

Water and especially sewer systems in poor areas are often totally deficient, exacerbating public health problems, contributing to environmental destruction and disaster prone areas. Paradoxically, the improvement of water supplies, when not mirrored by improved sanitation, aggravates surface water drainage and water-borne disease problems. (UNCHS 1996). Solid waste disposal is often in the same sad state. The spatial scale of urban environmental problems is vast (Bartone, Bernstein, Leitmann and Eigen 1994).

Urban development patterns, and the forms of urbanisation, are often the result of thousands of individual locational decisions, and bear little relationship to a land-use plan, even if one exists. Massive sprawl covers the landscape. Industrial, commercial and residential uses are often poorly sited in relationship to each other, to transportation requirements, to physical features of topography, flood plains, natural hazard zones, aquifer re-charge areas, or protective forests. Should the last-named persist, they will fall to the axe for fuel. Good agricultural land is consumed by random subdivision. Central areas are strangled under congestion and polluted air. New office towers and hotels, usually fenced and guarded, replace some of the traditional commercial or residential areas. The affluent live in heavily guarded, gated communities in attractive locations (Pirez 2002). The new industries of the transnational corporations seek prime suburban locations (Gilbert 1996, Ward 1990, Laquian 2001, Radoki 1997, McGee & Robinson (1995).

These, largely unintended, outcomes of metropolitan growth are largely ascribed to poor management, a lack of resources, fragmented local government. But fundamentally they are the results of the many interactions between multiple agents, (public, private, civil society), in different domains (economic, social, cultural, religious, civic), along different processes (political, market, voluntary), with different time horizons (short, medium and long). The challenge to metropolitan governance in fact is to be the catalyst for more intended results.
Which issues are local and which Metropolitan?

The question of which issues are best attacked at a local scale and which at the metropolitan is an ongoing problem, which can be attacked either from looking at what a defines a metropolitan region, or from sifting through the lists of local government functions and making choices. In general, a metropolitan region represents: 1) a unified labour market, from the point of view of both employers and employees: an opportunity to recruit or to work anywhere in the region, (which is why access is so important); 2) a spatial concentration of externalities (environmental, economic and social); 3) a human ecosystem depending on a common life support system and sharing the same resources (air, water, biotic systems) and 4) a multi-facetted cultural distinctiveness (partly after Borja and Castells 1997). These four factors are the “glue” that binds together the inhabitants of a metropolitan region, rich and poor, whether they recognise it or not, and which are beyond the abilities of individual local municipalities to manage.

The basic pre-requisites for an ideal functional metro region, regardless of what agency has the responsibility of providing them, are thus:

1. generalised access to jobs, activities and services;
2. free and safe movement of people (including civil rights and liberties, security);
3. reliability of supply (energy, water, food);
4. enabling legal frameworks (equity in the provision of services and taxation, civil liberties, markets, social rights, gender);
5. available space for all activities (residential, commercial, industrial, parks etc.);
6. an healthy environment;
7. cultural vitality;
8. easy access to the world outside.

These are fairly easily translated into services which should be provided on an area-wide basis. On the other hand, a moment’s reflection on any one subject, say access (transportation), it becomes evident that while major infrastructure must be provided at a metropolitan scale, there is no particular reason why small scale facilities should not be tended at the local level (in the case of transportation, local streets, taxicabs, feeder buses). This was best said years ago by Perloff (1967:720). “A useful distinction can be made between what might be called the skeletal items and the cellular items. The skeletal items are those that hold a region together as a unit of interrelated functions. The cellular items are those which are associated with given sizes of population and are repeated over and over again.” He sees the skeletal items as 1) the main systems, (transportation, communications, water, sewerage, electricity and the like), 2) environmental-setting items (water and air-shed protection, flood and pollution control), and 3) highly specialized services (higher education, specialized hospitals, airports, ports, high-order cultural facilities).

This line of reasoning leads to the notion of “nested” functions, which has to be clearly understood, and which occurs in many areas of public sector activity. For instance, in the transportation example, there is usually a national road system, there can be a state road system, a metropolitan road system, and a local road system, all working together to serve the population. This is why the
coordination of activities between various levels of government as well as between inter-related services is so critical to ensure smooth functioning in a metropolitan area.

**Which Issues are National and Which Metropolitan?**

Having established the need for metropolitan governance in relationship to local jurisdictions, the relationship of metro areas and senior levels of government, whether state/provincial or national, must be examined. Senior levels of government generally adopt policy relating to the general well-being of the population, namely health, education and social welfare systems, in the developed world, although they may be delivered by regional, metro or local organisations. In fact, several observers ascribe the persistence and growth of poverty to the cutbacks in social services endured by countries dealing with structural readjustment in the eighties and nineties (Beall 2002). In the developing world health, education and social welfare are often the responsibility of local governments. For instance, in India, amendment 74 to the Constitution (1992) devolved many of these activities to the panchayats (local municipalities). (Urban India, 2002)

The relationship of metropolitan and senior levels of government is in mutation in many parts of the world. While most formal metro institutions owe their existence to either directive or enabling legislation from senior levels of government, and often receive a substantial part of their funding from them, new regionalist observers suggest that metro-regions are becoming stronger political and economic players because of their own enterprise and energy. (Keating 1998, Jouve and Lefèvre, 1999) This means that hierarchical concepts of governance are being eroded and replaced by notions of partnership between the various levels of government. Thus, in addition to the idea of horizontal partnerships between the public, private and voluntary sector within a metro area, vertical partnerships with national, state or provincial agencies are also espoused.

However, it is not clear from the literature to what extent metro agencies are really considered as partners by senior levels of government. For the United States it has been noted that metropolitan structures, mandated by federal law in the 70’s and created by an act of state law, are more vigorous when there are plenty of outside funds available. Under the recent provisions for federal funding under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998 (known as TEA-21) they are presently quite active (Orfield 2002:138, Wheeler 2002:269).

Further, it must be noted that while most advocates of metropolitan governance are quite clear about the tasks that should be undertaken, in practice the waters are muddied. Most urban issues are not only inter-related and over-lapping, both in effect and scale, the public sector agencies set up to address these issues have inter-related and overlapping mandates. The notion of hierarchies of activities has to be translated into structured interdependencys, although in not too rigid a manner. Functional overlap is inevitable and negotiated authority a necessity. As one example, the following table illustrates these points in relationship to urban environmental management.
Certain countries have attempted to devise a national urban policy. This may be fairly complete as in the case of India, or it may be sectoral, dealing with one issue such as transport, urban renewal, community development, or housing as in most western countries. Further, as national policy, certain metropolitan areas that are also national capitals tend to receive special treatment, in that they are symbols of the State, contain the seat and apparatus of government, and are usually the focus of international activity.

2. WHICH PRIMARY POLICIES, AT VARIOUS LEVELS, ARE INFLUENCING METROPOLITAN OUTCOMES?

This question is without doubt the most impertinent in that as a starting point, it assumes a certain degree of relative autonomy of urban regions, either presupposed or sought. Nevertheless, it is central to understanding the range of issues, because many studies insist on the over-riding importance of superior levels of government, either in the legislative power that they wield or the fiscal arrangements they create. As John Friedmann (1998: 16) points out, “Although the concept of governance is inclusive of both the corporate sector and organised civil society, it is the state that is ultimately responsible for political decisions and their outcome”. McGee (1999:46) supports this view. Working in the context of South-East Asia he points out that no matter the type of metropolitan agency, political power still rests at the national, provincial or state-level in most developing nations. He also notes that the political elite, who rule these countries, are unwilling to give up power. Observation in North America also suggests that there is no popular political identification with metropolitan regions. Metro agencies are thus squeezed between national policies and local aspirations. At the same time, metropolitan areas concentrate and reflect the activities and impact of all levels of government. How can these influences be untangled?

The notion of overall metropolitan outcomes is not specifically dealt with in the literature. Usually, metropolitan questions are approached in terms of issues rather than results. As a preliminary observation, we can say that overall outcomes are the characteristics of a metropolitan area, usually described by its economic development and quality of life (Friedmann 1998, Scott 2001b). It is on these bases that most comparative studies are made.
There are three major approaches in the literature to sorting out policy impacts at various levels. These are: empirical studies, theoretical approaches, and pragmatic responses. Thus two very different types of research questions are asked: what are the policies that influence outcomes, and what are the policies that should influence outcomes?

The empirical approach has been tried in numerous studies, including that of the World Bank (2001) on transport strategy. Here the overlapping levels of authority within hierarchical systems are recognised as potentially conflictual, and it is recommended that a very clear and explicit separation of functions between levels in the hierarchy may avoid problems. However, assigning functions to different agencies without appropriate reallocation of funding can have disastrous results, as was illustrated in many independent countries of the former Soviet Union (World Bank 2001:167).

Agreement between senior levels of government and metro areas on the division of both responsibilities and funding may be very difficult to reach, particularly where political control is in the hands of different political parties in each, a not unusual situation in many countries, states or provinces.

In a federal State with four levels of authority (nation, state/provincial, regional/metro, and local) the situation becomes even more complicated. For instance, in the US, Orfield (2002) has analysed the limitations of federal urban programs since the thirties, noting they were largely crisis driven and not the result of holistic analysis. During the depression, loan and public housing programs were created; in the post-war years and during the riotous times of the sixties it was urban renewal; in the recessionary early nineties it was empowerment zones for community development and job creation; today it is transportation. Katz (2000) complains that although such programs doubtless do some good, they simply do not attack the overall, interrelated nature of metro development problems.

This also illustrates the fact that urban policies in the Western world, are usually directed at specific pressing problems which are perceived as being sufficiently urgent to gain significant political support. For instance at the present time, social exclusion is a major preoccupation, especially in Europe, and many initiatives are directed to this end; access to employment (training and workfare), citizenship, education, youth integration, housing, and daycare (O Cinneide 2001).

The theoretical logical-deductive approach has been employed in some studies, especially those related to fiscal federalism. One example is that of Enid Slack (2001), working largely with the Toronto example. She maintains that the type of governing structure will have an effect on the efficiency with which services are provided and on the ability to share costs fairly and efficiently throughout a region. An effective regional tier of government permits redistribution, can charge user fees and property taxes and borrow for capital spending and thus provide good services and promote equity.

A third very pragmatic persuasive approach, consists of laying out all the data on metropolitan functioning, and ascribing the conditions of facilities and infrastructure to the various responsible agencies, so that a great deal of transparency is achieved in finding out who is responsible for what. Information that is usually a mystery to most residents. Orfield (1997) in his first Metropolitics
book on the Twin Cities was able to use this technique to force the case for a functional metropolitan agency, by visually demonstrating the uneven spatial distribution of both deficiencies and taxing, through GIS mapping, a powerful tool.

**Policies that Influence Outcomes**

An analytic reading of the literature indicates that there are thus three primary policy domains of superior levels of government which influence overall outcomes in metropolitan areas: the powers and level of autonomy granted to a metro authority, the level of fiscal resources, and the rules of the game.

*Metropolitan Level Powers and Authority*

The purely metropolitan services argued for in question 1 have to be translated into functional metro-wide services. These include, economic and social development, public transportation, major infrastructure (water, sewer, roads, energy), land-use planning, environmental protection, and a strong legal framework, and since they are so strongly interrelated, hopefully under one umbrella. Only the national or state/provincial government can legislate for the establishment of such a body: as noted earlier, a voluntary association, through imaginable in the evolutionary sense, cannot ultimately have the required authority. (Friedmann 1998, McGee 1999).

*Allocation of Resources*

Without adequate funding and staffing no agency will operate well. This has been well demonstrated at certain periods in time everywhere in the world. National government funding tends to be variable depending on the economy: autonomous sources are essential for sustainability and stability. The ability to tax (e.g., real estate, sales, hotels), to charge user fees, transact property, borrow and lend, contract out, enter into partnerships, and to privatize, are essential to ensure stable revenues, forward planning, and the ability to manoeuvre (Frisken 2001). The key element in region-wide coordination, and in maintaining equitable services throughout a metropolitan area is an acceptance of the principle of sharing the costs and the benefits of urban growth and change (Bourne 2001).

*Rules of the Game*

The rules governing the functioning of a metropolitan agency have to be clearly spelled out from the outset. Dodge (1996:59) indicates that the success of the institutionalisation of regional governance is dependant upon the development of appropriate problem-solving and service delivery mechanisms. Oakerson (1999:19) expands this idea, specifying that rules must define the organisation of the provision of services, the organisation of the public production of services and the relationship between provision and production.
Roles of Other Players

While the devolution of power and authority from the central to the metro level is the most important policy arena for influencing overall outcomes, since governance is multi-facetted, a similar analysis should be made for the private sector actors and civil society. Hamilton (2000) notes that, the type, interaction and relative strength and extent of influence of the various actors is in itself changeable. Influences that resulted in a particular response become stronger for a while, then may dissipate as change occurs. Some actors may promote regionalism and localism simultaneously – this is typical of senior levels of government. The following table illustrates these relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Regional Influence on Local Governing Systems</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Federal Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Civic Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Leaders and Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical and Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hamilton 2000: 70

The major actors identified by Hamilton are of course an expandable list in a metropolitan system.

Policies that Should Influence Outcomes

The new regionalists and the new economy proponents are very vigorous in promoting what they believe should be policy outcomes to make urban regions successful. In fact some of the writing tends to be reminiscent of nineteenth century boosterism. For instance, in order to be competitive in the globalized knowledge based economy it is argued that there are four challenges to be met in metropolitan areas: 1) Public and private organizations must adjust to the global trends reshaping regional economies 2) they must find more efficient ways of providing the technology and infrastructure for transportation, communications, production and service delivery 3) they must create and sustain institutions for developing knowledge and skills that people need to participate productively, and 4) they must foster an attractive quality of life that provides cultural, social and recreational amenities and healthy environmental conditions (Rondinelli 2001). As has been noted by a number of authors, precisely how to achieve these outcomes is barely mentioned (Norris 2001).
3. WHAT ARE THE APPROPRIATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES FOR METROPOLITAN ISSUES TO ENSURE BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COLLABORATION?

Decision-making processes are extremely difficult to untangle in even the simplest circumstances. They have been much more studied at community and national scales than at metropolitan levels. The notion “appropriate” has both normative and, above all, contextual implications. The particular characteristics of each agglomeration, in terms of geography, history, economy, sociology and institutional development are probably the most important factors to be considered on how decisions are taken, as is concluded in many studies. Brenner (2002), looking at metropolitan regionalism in the United States, sees contemporary regionalist projects as place-specific responses to the new forms of socio-spatial polarization. Rather than being a push towards a new regionalism, they are interpreted as a “new politics of scale” in which local, state-level and federal institutions and actors, as well as local social movements, are struggling to adjust to diverse restructuring processes that are changing inherited territorial organization.

Decision-making can be looked at from two points of view, the nature of collaborative arenas in which coordination and decision-making occur, and the active process of negotiating decisions.

**Coordinative Approaches**

Various approaches to the study of collective decision-making in metropolitan regions can be deduced from the literature. Unfortunately, these are usually limited to the analysis of the structure and activities of governmental institutions, for obvious reasons: to gauge the activities of all the actors would be unbelievably difficult. Again, the research approaches are descriptive and prescriptive.

Descriptive accounts are usually case studies, which demonstrate the types of coordination necessary to achieve success in a project. Coordination requires that two, or usually more, organizations take parallel decisions. Prud’homme (1996) describes the range of coordinative efforts that must occur in a mega-city in addition to inter-governmental cooperation. These are: between the public and private sectors, between formal and informal mechanisms, between politicians and professionals; and between sectors. The World Bank (2001) study on transport distinguishes between:

1. spatial and jurisdictional coordination, (vertically through the hierarchy), between overlapping jurisdictions, between contiguous authorities, and between local authorities);
2. functional coordination (for instance: between land-use and transportation planning, between modes, between traffic management and policing);
3. operational coordination (between public and private enterprise, between many private companies).

While these lists of decision-making loci might appear daunting, Hamilton (2000:74) notes that the establishment of regional structures either reduces the total number of local governments, or (more likely) reduces the number of governments performing a given function, and thus simplifies governance by the creation of processes to address regional problems.
Prescriptive approaches to decision-making processes are a hallmark of the new regionalism literature. Norris (2001) points out that prescriptions of the new regionalists and the metropolitan reformers are quite different. New regionalists call for regional economic competitiveness and a cohesive response to regional problems, without explicitly saying how, but implicitly relying on voluntary cooperation to achieve these aims, while metropolitan reformers look for the creation of strong metropolitan government structures.

While prescriptive approaches have largely been based on the imperative of belief in the new regionalism, an alternative view has been posited by Innes and Booher (1999). In an attempt to mediate the claims of environmentalists and economic development, recourse is made to “complex adaptive systems” thinking. Complex adaptive systems, a concept borrowed from the sciences, interpret the world as an organism with all the consequent implications of growth, feedback and evolution. They involve networks of relationships among many components, which interact in both competitive and collaborative ways, so that they co-evolve and mutually adapt. From a study of California through the lens of complexity theory come four ideas about metropolitan development. 1) Simplification results in fundamentally wrong answers, and focus on individual sectors separately will be counterproductive. 2) Effects cannot be directly traced to causes because an intervention reverberates through the system in ways that can only be partially traced. 3) Even small changes introduced into the system may produce discontinuous, unpredicted effects. 4) Adaptive changes within a system can grow from learning generated by the individual interactions in the networks of system participants (Innes and Booher 1999:6).

From these observations come three principal strategies for improving metropolitan performance, designed to make the whole system more informed, responsive and transformative, and each one targeting a different type of decision-maker. These are: 1) the development of indicators and performance criteria in more telling ways, 2) the use of collaborative consensus among knowing stakeholders, (dialogic democracy in Giddens’s (1994) terms) and 3) the creation of new forms of leadership (self-reflective) (Innes and Booher 1999).

Communicative theory has received growing interest, especially in framing the decision-making process in urban planning. Drawing on Habermasian theories of communication, aided by much case-study empirical work on how development actually occurs, it is posited that the planner facilitates communicative interchanges between direct stakeholders and the community at large (Healy 1997). By this means better debate, discussion and deliberation are occasioned, and better decisions made. Place-blind, positivist decisions are avoided, and interactive governance practices, improving creative responses, social learning, and inclusiveness are promoted.

While seductive, this analysis and prescription does not go unchallenged. For example, Huxley and Yiftachel (2000) have complained, as have many observers writing on the new regionalism, that theorization and normative proscription are conflated. The role of societal institutions in facilitating and containing decision making is minimized. Planning must be understood “as a state strategy in the creation and regulation of space, populations and development.” (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000:339)
Analytic approaches include those of Jouve and Lefèvre (1999), Keating (1998), and Orfield (2002), which focus on socio-political coalitions, and the fashion in which they are mobilized. These include the relationships between the various levels of government, particularly because they occupy a central role in decision-making. Keating (1998) believes that politics has been neglected in the contemporary regionalism debate. He regards the notion of self-regulated mechanisms espoused by the “New Public Management” school, with its vocabulary of governance, networks and bounded pluralism, as a negation of citizenship, democracy and social cohesion. Papadapoulos (2000) suggests that managing preexisting conflicts through consolidation may have contributed to establishing and consolidating the neo-corporatism presently advocated. The techniques of committees, panels of experts, round tables and other stable networks have contributed to building trust.

The difficulties of undertaking inter-jurisdictional collaboration have been studied by Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) They have classified the different formulae for intergovernmental coordination according to the degree of difficulty of their establishment and maintenance. They are simply classified as: easy, middling, and difficult. Easiest are: informal cooperation, inter-local service contracts, joint powers agreements, Regional Councils and/or Councils of Government (COGs), federally encouraged single-purpose regional bodies, State Planning and Development Districts (SPDDs), and contracting out. Middling difficult include: Special Districts, transfer of functions, annexation, Regional Special Districts and Authorities, Metropolitan Multi-purpose Districts, and the reformed urban County. Hardest to achieve are the consolidated City-County, two-tier restructuring, and three tier reforms.

Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), in studying partnership in the UK, see plural modes of government, shown in the following diagram, as inter-agency relationships of competition and collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Governance – Market, Hierarchy and Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARKET</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of commitment among the parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone or climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor preferences or choices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lowndes and Skelcher 1998
The market mode (private sector) revolves around contractual relationships and prices; the hierarchy is coordinating (public sector); the network is the actors with complementary interests (civil society) based on trust loyalty and reciprocity. If this analysis is correct, it is not surprising that Jouve and Lefèvre (1999) speak of a new brand of “political entrepreneurs”.

**Process of Negotiating Decisions**

The process of institutional decision-making has received more attention in the political science and sociological literature, than in public administration and planning. Political science research has looked at behavioural strategies within institutions, largely based on legislative processes, and a school of thought, the “new institutionalism” is emerging, which typically asks questions about forms of governance, and especially the problems of aggregate behaviour (March and Olsen 1989), rules systems and transaction costs.

In a decision-making situation, rules of meeting and authority to act are essential. It is well known that a councilor representing a local government on a metropolitan board may support a given proposal for the region, but then have difficulty in defending the project back home. While most ‘round table’ situations aim at consensus, or near “accommodated unanimity,” through debate, discussion, and argumentation, hot dissent may have to result in voting. Voting is the most well known method of collective decision making, and the most apparent way of signaling choice and communicating preferences. Representation must be clear before things start. Unanimity, plurality, or simple majority decision; representation by population or representation by tax assessment or another apportionment, must be fixed long before the decision-making body gets into substantive work (Herzberg and Ostrom 2000). Choice of agenda, who controls the items, and the way in which they are presented, are major determinants in what is ultimately agreed upon (Wilson and Herzberg 2000:187). Institutional rules on the blocking of power, rights to veto, and absences or abstentions must be formulated early in the game (Wilson and Herzberg 2000:187). In other words procedural rules must be agreed upon before substantive issues are broached.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary rules</th>
<th>Entry and exit conditions for participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope rules</td>
<td>Allowable actions and allowable outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position and authority</td>
<td>Distribution of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation</td>
<td>Aggregation of joint decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Procedural rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information rules</td>
<td>Informational constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payoff rules</td>
<td>How benefits and costs are to be distributed to participants in positions of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ostrom 2000:105; Kiser and Ostrom 2000
Decision-making in complex, multinucleated, non-hierarchally coordinated structures can best be understood by 1) knowing the decision-making environment (the cultural dynamics according to Visser 2002); 2) understanding both group interaction process variables and group perceptual and behavioral variables and 3) understanding the processes of interaction of participatory groups.

**Decision-making Environment**

Legitimate participants (a question to be reflected upon) in a ‘round table’ for policy formulation and decision-making, generally come from the three divisions of economic life: government (both elected representatives and civil servants), the private sector and civil society (NGOs etc). Their objectives, socialization and modus operandi are typically quite different. The following simplified chart illustrates their difference in approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-Making Environments</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Third Sector (Civil Society/NGOs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styles of Management</td>
<td>Instinctive</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Horizontal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>CEO/’Bossism’</td>
<td>Charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientele</td>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>Shareholders</td>
<td>Client-group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
<td>Legislative debate</td>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Consensual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making horizon</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Short/Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Satisfy basic needs of population</td>
<td>Profits</td>
<td>Respond to problems of client group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is much research demonstrating the functionally authoritative roles of local government administrators. These must be divided into the politicians and the civil service, since they clearly operate at different levels, the latter having the advantage of professional expertise and a thorough knowledge of local problems (Nalbandian 1991, Seldon, Brewer and Brudney 1999). The role of middle managers (Considine and Lewis 1999) and low-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) has also received attention. The complexities of the private sector are fairly self-evident. While there is evidently a fair amount of work on business decision making, the role of the captains of business and industry in public arenas has received no attention.

Civil society, usually portrayed as moral and socio-economic rather than political, has received much attention of recent times. Although widely embraced as a concept, particularly in development studies, it is in reality a very mixed bag. (Biker gangs would be classed as civil society). Agencies tend to gloss over the fact that civil society organizations may be very different from each other and not representative of the general norms of society, especially since notions of civic engagement are Euro-American derived (Howell and Pierce 2001). Fowler (2002) suggests that the whole concept needs more rigorous examination, and proposes that work on the Third Sector (NGOs and non-profits), and organizations such as professional associations, labour bodies, trade unions, ethnic, religious and other groups be studied separately. Edwards and Hulme (1995) have looked at the strengths and weakness of NGOs and their marginal accountability.
Clearly the triadic decision-making model of state, market and civil society needs to be thought through with caution. However decision-making is also nuanced in many other ways. Decisions are made through a process of interaction, debate and mutual adjustment, incrementally and disjointedly, often with imperfect information, uncertainty, risk, and cognitive limits on comprehensive analysis. Consensus building can be a systematic, though time consuming task (Cormick et al. 1996), and there is a rapidly burgeoning literature on negotiating techniques, the most famous being that of Fisher and Ury's (1991) “Getting to Yes”.

**Group Interaction Processes, Perceptual and Behavioural Variables**

The actual process of negotiation is highly influenced by both process variables and behavioural variables. Without wishing to probe individual psyches, it is possible to make some generalizations. Rondinelli (1970, reprinted numerous times) has brilliantly summed this up in the following table, which requires no further elucidation. So far, the search of the literature has not turned up empirical studies based on this framework, although many studies touch various components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables Influencing Participation In and Control Over Policy Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors influencing scope and intensity of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group interaction process variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of intermediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition and deterrence capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of coalition building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of interaction costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptual and behavioural variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of benefits and threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto and delay capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations of achieving goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success in past policy conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of subjective uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of organizational policy space</td>
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Rondinelli 1970

**Process of Interaction**

The process of interaction is further regulated by the relative degree of control of the participants over the policy issue in hand, their choice in compliance, and their degree of intervention in policy conflict. Again, Rondinelli has summarized these issues in the diagram shown below.
4. **HOW DO INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE METROPOLITAN LEVEL INFLUENCE THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND THE OVERALL OUTCOMES?**

The extraordinary variety of metropolitan institutional arrangements is amazing. As has been found in the literature, even within one country, such as the US or Canada, there is enormous variation (Savitch and Vogel 1996, Rothblatt and Sancton 1993, Tomalty 1997). Further, formal metropolitan institutional structures may not function at all as suggested on paper or in the statutes. It has been noted by many authors that seemingly grand-sounding agencies are toothless or under-financed. For instance, Ruland (1996:6) shows how the Metropolitan Manila Commission, established in 1975, was essentially window-dressing.

Evaluations of metropolitan governance tend to focus on the formal legal-institutional structures, and do not offer as much direct material on how these influence decision-making as they do on outcomes. Statistical studies (mostly from the United States) are less conclusive than monographs on single cities, however relying on the latter makes comparisons hazardous since research methodologies differ widely. General studies tend to focus more on outputs (with dollar values), than they do on outcomes.

Conclusions are generally sceptical on the effect of structures: Jouve and Lefèvre (1999), Parks and Oakerson (2000), Ruland (1996) are all of the opinion that these may not be as important as political culture. Keating (1998:7), speaking of Europe, is of the opinion that “the existence of a regional government is not essential for a development coalition, but it does make a considerable difference”. A further observation is that the same structure may not have the same effect over the course of time.
Metropolitan Institutions in their National Context: Effects on Decision-making

Government institutions are “nested” through all levels. It is not sufficient to know which sector of jurisdiction they occupy, but the relative role they play in the sector. Responsibilities between the various levels have to be clearly stated in order to avoid both duplication and having a problem fall between the cracks.

Metropolitan governments may be both providers of service (perhaps through subcontracting, partnerships, etc.), and deliverers of services devolved from higher levels of government. In the latter case most key decisions are taken top-down. In a general way they operate in a socio-institutional context of competing claims. Many metropolitan agencies are passive rather than proactive: lack of political authority and resource constraints limit their effectiveness. Decisions are only taken on operative services and new initiatives are only undertaken under duress, usually from a senior level of government.

The influence of national politicians on regional and local matters is very strong. Institutions are facilitated by secure, regular funding, but usually senior-level politicians are unwilling to cede power, resources and influence.

Influence of metropolitan structures on decision-making

There are many opinions about the effects of fragmentation, or consolidation, on public participation, which is believed to improve decision-making. It is generally held, and observation supports this, that the smaller the unit of local government, the higher the degrees of public involvement. There are also many opinions about the difficulty of mobilizing local elites, without reliable studies to back them up. Visser (2002) recognizing these gaps, proposes a research agenda which would focus on political culture, inter-local relationships, values, interests, and degrees of trust, to untangle the causes and effects of these observations.

One of the problems of metropolitan agencies is that since the governing council is usually elected indirectly (often as a local municipal council), or appointed because of holding a certain key post, there is little overt political activity associated with it, except when there is a crisis, such as a hike in taxes or user fees. Most of the time residents have no sense of identification with it.

Influence of institutions on outcomes

Monographs on the operation of individual metropolitan institutions usually give very mixed reviews. Metropolitan structures are effective in some activities but not all. Evaluations of complete metropolitan governments in the west tend to be positive, (e.g, Frisken 2001): others focus on the improvements that could be made to cause them to function better, be more productive and produce better results (eg McGee and Robinson 1995).

Statistical studies on the effectiveness of metropolitan physical form and structure are less conclusive (Kenworthy and Laube 1999, Cervero 2001). Most such research has been done in the
developed world: how such work would work out in the developing countries, where data limitations are well known, remains to be seen.

A very different approach to measure the influence of institutions on outcomes is that employed by van den Berg, Braun, and van der Meer (1997). They attempt to evaluate metro regions in Europe according to their concept of Metropolitan Organizing Capacity. They have done this by adopting definitional criteria that are observable, and sometimes measurable. Organizing capacity is, the ability to enlist (leadership), all the actors involved (strategic networks), and with their help (political and societal support), to generate new ideas and develop and implement a policy (vision and strategy), designed to respond to fundamental developments (incentive of spatial-economic problems), and created conditions (coherence of the elements momentum), for sustainable development (in the metropolitan area). These elements form a system, and are influenced by the formal institutional framework in place. This notion of Metropolitan Organizing Capacity, while conjectural, is a fine attempt to reflect the politico-administrative system in place.

**Sectoral studies**

Most empirical studies examine only one aspect of metropolitan functions. Sectoral studies, usually made according to the jurisdiction of the institution being examined, tend to be limited in their scope. There are a fair variety of these, and for the purpose of this review can be grouped into the following categories: economic development, social disparities, costs of public services, environment and alternative means of service delivery.

*Economic development and metropolitan government*

Improved economic development is thought to result from metropolitan regional governance structures. It has been argued that elastic cities that can expand their boundaries are in better financial shape, have fewer social problems and have more prosperous economies (Rusk 1993). The new regionalism school of thought has this idea as a central tenet of its beliefs, and has used it as a selling point for restructuring.

It argues that consolidation provides the potential for economic planning and development that would otherwise be absent (Weiss 2001). Small local municipalities do not have the financial resources, jurisdiction or technical skills to promote economic development. Suburban municipalities are often in competition with each other for business and industry with the result that opportunities may be lost to the area. Agglomerated urban areas can afford an active economic-promotion agency which will provide better coordination, expertise, planning and locational advice (Carr and Feiock 1999). This may reduce uncertainty for potential investors, and reduce transaction costs through providing "one stop shopping", and having a firmer grasp on rules and regulations, capitalisation sources, tax regimes, transportation options, and labour markets.

Empirical studies are not so definitive. Burns (1994) has shown that manufacturers may deliberately choose small suburban municipalities because tax rates are low. Working in the US, examining nine metropolitan areas from 1950 to 1993, Carr and Feiock (1999) have shown no link between consolidation and economic development. Numerous research projects have shown that
central-city and surrounding suburban prosperity are strongly related (Barnes and Ledebur 1998, Savitch, Collins, Sanders and Markham 1992), but Post and Stein (2000) have shown that fragmented metropolitan area governance does not directly affect this urban-suburban economic dependence. In fact Parks and Oakerson (1993:38-39) found that overlapping jurisdictions can actually facilitate interlocal problem solving.

Lobo and Rantisi (1999) have examined investment in local (non-state, non-federal) infrastructure as a determinant of metropolitan productivity in the US between 1977 and 1992. Although no significant relationship between the levels of investment and levels of productivity were found, there was a significant positive relationship between growth rates of public capital investment and the growth rate of metropolitan productivity.

Social disparities and metropolitan regions

Problems of social segregation, exclusion and poverty in metropolitan areas have received much attention (Borja and Castells 1997). The differences between poor and rich local municipalities within a metropolitan region are often used as an argument for consolidation on the basis of equity. The metropolis would serve as an agent of redistribution in the provision of collective goods, promote fair housing policies, regional sewer systems and good public transportation, thus benefiting the underprivileged. These are the arguments of Myron Orfield, the regional-reform crusading Minnesota State legislator, who successfully put in place the operational Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St Paul) in 1994 (Orfield 1998).

A massive review of all the recent research on metropolitan governance and social disparity undertaken by the National Research Council of the U.S. (Altshuler et al. 1999) showed very inconclusive results. The fragmentation of local government sorts people into very unequal communities in terms of income, status and employment, but it is not known if the degree of fragmentation affects the degree of racial and economic segregation. The effect of regionalism, (some form of metropolitan government) which presupposes a greater equalisation of service delivery has not been tested. In fact, much of the discussion is devoted to proposing a research agenda to investigate these problems. Contradictions abound. Ellen (1999) found that the greater the degree of fragmentation, the lower the racial disparity between central city and suburbs while Cutler and Glaeser (1997) found that the number of municipalities in metropolitan areas is positively related to metropolitan-area racial segregation.

In the new regionalist discourse, economic development, job creation, and thus work opportunities for the unemployed are supposed to address these problems, and the voluntary sector look after the distressed. Social heterogeneity and social cohesion are areas of concern: it is considered important that people should feel they have a place and a role in the social system. Social cohesion implies: “extending opportunities for income generating activities; reductions in poverty; reduces disparities in income, employment and competitiveness; higher quality of life; and open access to services of general benefit and protection”. (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 999) In a qualitative study on social cohesion and multi-level urban governance in the UK, the same authors found major connections at the city/ city-region scale, as the following table shows, despite the fact that most cities do not have the resources to support significant economic development agencies.
Addressing Social Cohesion at Different Spatial Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of social cohesion</th>
<th>National/Inturban</th>
<th>City/Region</th>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common values/Civic culture</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social order/Social control</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social solidarity/Wealth disparities</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks/Social capital</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place attachment/Identity</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓✓ Domain in which urban governance attention and efforts are clearly evident.
✓ Domain in which there is a case for greater attention from urban governance.

Kearns and Forrest 2000

The three dimensions of social cohesion most often addressed at the City/City-region scale are the maintenance of social order – particularly social control in urban centres, the improvement of civic culture, and the development of a strong local identity and place attachment. (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1006)

**Costs of municipal services and metropolitan government**

The per-capita cost of public goods provided by local governments versus metropolitan regions has been the subject of much research. Do economies of scale really exist? The answer to this question really seems to lie in the nature of the good or the service being provided (Stein 1990). Many researchers have demonstrated that local governments provide services more cheaply than metro or regional governments (Boynes 1992, Dowding 1994).

However, there are dissenting views. Foster (1997) in an examination of U.S. metropolitan areas showed that Special Districts tend to spend more per-capita than general purpose governments. The DuPage Intergovernmental Task Force (1992), reporting on a county just west of Chicago, showed that in waste-water treatment, there are considerable economies of scale in joint action.

Stein (1990) contends that judgements about the performance of local municipal versus metropolitan structures are derived from a limited conceptualization of the relationship between the structure of metropolitan governance and its policy products. He points out that most researchers have asked the wrong question. They have asked, “Is organisation important?”, rather than “How is organisation important to the performance of public policy?”

**Environment and Metropolitan Development**

Preserving, rescuing and enhancing the physical and natural environments of cities and regions has long been a preoccupation of activists and scientists. It includes the preservation of natural environments, the clean-up and redevelopment of brownfield areas, renovating historic sites, improving air and water quality, maintaining the beauty of natural landscapes, preserving agricultural land, reducing noise and congestion, developing “green” infrastructure, and increasing recycling, and renewable energy sources. Sustainable development depends on strong environmental policies.
While earlier environmentalists advocated “Plan with Nature” (McHarg 1975), more recent concerns have focused on public health issues, from contaminated water to the effect of the release of poisonous chemicals into the air and water. (Lewis Mumford once wrote that changes do not occur until the lives of the elite are put at risk).

A new slant in the promotion of sound environmental policy and environmental justice is related to the new regionalism. Making cities attractive for development, pleasant and healthy to live in, and interesting to visit, is part of the new agenda. City-regions, rather than local municipalities, are seen as the most effective unit of management, since clearly all natural systems (water, air, soil, biota) and built forms are interrelated (Weiss 2001).

Transportation and Land-use Planning and Metropolitan Jurisdiction

It is on the basis of land-use and transportation planning that the strongest arguments are made for a metropolitan agency. This has been a continuous argument in the literature at least since the nineteenth century. The costs and wastefulness of urban sprawl, while often quantified, have now become the focus of fierce debate, political action and legislation in many parts of the world. The present quest for “smart growth”, higher density development as promoted by the “new urbanism”, and the direct linking of public transportation with development are seen as imperative in creating quality of life for urban dwellers, as well as preserving good agricultural farmland, preventing development on land subject to natural hazards, while ensuring the suitable location of business, industry, residential, and green space areas. (Calthorpe 2001)

Growth management has become a cause célèbre in the United States, and many states, including New Jersey, Oregon, Washington and Vermont have adopted legislation to help promote higher densities, infill, and urban development limits.

Prudhomme and Lee (1999), using data from French and Korean cities on city size, labor force proximity and commuting speeds, reveal strong relationships between land-use and transport, and suggest that spatial planning and a good transportation system significantly increase economic output. Nelson and Peterman (2000) using data from US metropolitan areas, of which 26 have had growth management policies since 1982, have found a positive association between planning and economic performance. On the other hand, Porter (1997) argues that containment results in land-rent increases, demonstrating this with evidence from Portland, Oregon.

Alternative Methods of Service Delivery

The privatisation of the production of public goods has been hotly debated since the early eighties, essentially starting with the election of the Thatcher government in the UK. It has been led by three driving elements: private sector management is supposed to be superior to that of the public sector; the introduction of competition is expected to increase efficiency and better protect consumer interests; and encouraging the entry of the private sector means access to new source of capital for cash strapped cities. Again results are mixed. In the U.K., the cost of water has increased, but electricity decreased (Defeuilley 1999). The major cautionary tale seems to be that a strong regulatory environment is a necessity.
5. HOW DO SPECIFIC SECTORAL INTERVENTIONS INTERRELATE WITH THE OVERALL OUTCOMES?

The overall outcomes sought for metro governance as deduced in section 1 are:

1. generalised access to jobs, activities and services;
2. free and safe movement of people (including civil rights and liberties, security);
3. reliability of supply (energy, water, food);
4. enabling legal frameworks (civil liberties, markets, social rights, gender);
5. human capital: an educated and trained workforce;
6. available space for all activities (residential, commercial, industrial, parks etc.);
7. an healthy environment;
8. cultural vitality.
9. easy access to the world outside.

However, sectoral interventions are usually classified functionally: economic development; social development (health, education, culture); infrastructure (public works), such as water, sewer, solid waste management, roads, electricity; environmental protection; transportation and land-use planning. As has already been shown, coordination between these activities is usually accomplished through intersectoral boards, committees and agencies. It is worth noting the necessity for coordinating these functions, so that outcomes can be cumulative, complimentary, integrated and beneficial for all the population, is the most powerful argument for metropolitan government.

It seems evident from the literature that in terms of sectoral interventions and their interrelationships with overall outcomes in terms of public goods, that transportation and land-use planning is the key policy arena. It is odd that many jurisdictions have separate agencies for transportation planning (and even for roads and public transit), and for land-use planning. The transportation land-use nexus, the linking of business, industry, and social activity centres, and residential areas, and the means of moving people and goods between them is fundamental in terms of efficiency in cost and time. The fit of employment centres, means of transportation and place of residence (jobs-houses) improves economic output. Kentworthy and Laube (1999: 632) found gross regional product per capita was generally higher in less auto-dependent cities.

The provision of other public goods, main water and sanitation systems, the location of sanitary land-fills, the protection of fragile areas from development, the protection of water-bodies from polluting activities, the reservation of open-space, and the siting of health, educational, social, and cultural facilities then follow the broad patterns set out in a metropolitan structure plan.

Almost all urban observers regard metropolitan spatial planning as an absolute essential. Hall and Pfeiffer (2001:190) stress that solutions to metro region chaos must be created by central legislation even though planning may not be by traditional methods. Some writers emphasize the need to understand the physical geography of a mega-urban region in order to able to cope with environmental pressures. McGee (1999:51) underlines the necessity to shift from sectoral management to metropolitan management.
Without strong regional influence it is predicted that nimbyism will become a constantly growing bottleneck to development (Hall and Pfeiffer 2000:190). Even the U.S. has now acknowledged the need for regional approaches, through the ISTEA and TEA-21 programs funding transit and urban form projects. Understanding how settlement patterns, densities, land-use compositions and urban form influence transit use, and reduce automobile dependency, pollution and noise, has become a prime target (Transit Cooperative Research Program 1995)

CONCLUSION

While since the early nineties there has been a resurgence of interest in metropolitan regions, and many papers published, the conclusions to this review are tentative. First, it can be deduced that no model of metropolitan governance will fit all cases: there is no ideal solution. This conclusion is corroborated by the work of Bourne (2001) and Klink (2002). Evaluation of metropolitan regions can only be made on results, not on institutional arrangements. Secondly, while there is general agreement that the new discourse on governance, (the triad model of state, market and civil society, globalization and competitiveness, the competing claims of the new regionalists, the public choice school and the metropolitan consolidationists), adds to the knowledge base about how metropolitan regions work, and how they might work, there is great diversity in the definition and validity of these terms. Governance is read by some as a pragmatic extension of participatory democracy, and by others as a threat to freely elected representative democratic government.

Five questions were posed to probe the ways that metropolitan governments function. These are:

1. **What has to be decided at the metropolitan level?** There are two aspects to this question. In functional terms, there is general agreement that these include: major infrastructure, transportation networks, water and sewerage systems, waste management, broad brush spatial planning, and along with equitable cost-sharing fiscal arrangements. The new addition, in comparison with the analyses of the sixties, is economic development. In the interests of competitiveness, all the forces of change must be mobilized to this end; but what has to be done precisely for economic development at the metropolitan level is not clear.

2. **Which primary policies, at various levels, influence metropolitan outcomes?** Policies have to be devised to deal with territorial extent, and with sectoral issues. Three major policy domains by senior levels of government contribute to metropolitan effectiveness (a) the legislation setting up a metropolitan agency, with clearly defined rights and duties, recognizing that most functions are interlocking and overlapping (b) stable, ongoing, independently administered, adequate sources of funding (eg. taxing and borrowing powers, ability to transact property and resources, to hire and fire, to own and sell, etc.) (c) well defined rules of procedure and decision making.

3. **What are the appropriate decision-making processes for metropolitan issues to ensure both vertical and horizontal collaboration?** The new politics of scale must be recognized. There can be no fixed rule because local history, culture and habits must be respected. Loci of decision-making must be identified to ensure (a) spatial and jurisdictional coordination, (b) functional coordination and (c) operational coordination. In a decision-making situation, procedural rules relating to (a) conduct of meetings (b) legitimate participation (authority) and (c) the taking of decisions (consensus, voting, representation, right of veto) must be established before substantive issues are debated.
4. **How do institutional arrangements at the metropolitan level influence the decision-making processes and the overall outcomes?** Metropolitan agencies get very mixed reviews, regardless of their structure, mainly based on experiential evidence. The concept of *Metropolitan Organizing Capacity*, based on an evaluation of procedures, is promising (van den Berg, Braun, and van de Meer 1997). Studies of sectoral activities (single purpose agencies) show contradictory results. For economic development, there are studies that show positive results for fragmented metropolises, and others that show positive results for consolidated areas. Similarly, for studies of social cohesion, and the costs of municipal infrastructure, there are wide divergencies. It is in the fields of environmental management, and land-use and transportation planning that the advantages of a metropolitan agency are most clearly demonstrated, although even in these fields there are dissenters. The variation in results is due to different methodological approaches, different research locations, different temporal periods, different ways of measuring impact, and above all, different political contexts.

5. **How do specific sectoral interventions inter-relate with overall outcomes?** Land-use and transportation planning is the key policy arena. Planning and economic performance have been shown to have a positive association (Nelson and Peterman, 2000), as do commuting speeds and economic output. (Prudhomme and Lee 1999). If land-use and transportation are appropriately planned, then provision of other public goods, water and sewer services, open space and community health, education and social facilities are presumably also well located. All this is completely logical, since of all municipal services, land-use planning is the only one that claims to be integrative.
APPENDIX

The evaluation of good metropolitan governance is tentatively referred back to the criteria of the good city prepared by John Friedmann (1998). An attempt has been made to interpret these criteria into measurable indices of performance or outcomes. This part of the work can only be finalized through debate of the issues already analysed.

Criteria for the Good City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for the Good City</th>
<th>Evaluation measures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good City Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired political leadership: leaders capable of articulating a common vision for the polity, building a strong consensus around this vision, and mobilizing resources towards its realisation.</td>
<td>Free elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public accountability: (1) the uncoerced, periodic election of political representatives and (2) the right of local citizens to be adequately informed about those who stand for elections, the governments performance record, and the overall outcomes for the city (see III below)</td>
<td>Recognition of multiple stakeholders (government/ private sector/ third sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness: the right of all citizens to be directly involved in the formulation of policies and programs whenever consequences are expected significantly to affect their life and livelihood.</td>
<td>Recognition of popular participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness: the fundamental right of citizens to claim rights and express grievances; to appropriate channels for this purpose; to a government that is accessible to people in their neighbourhoods and districts; and to an acknowledgement by government that citizens’ claims and grievances require an attentive, appropriate response.</td>
<td>Direct election of representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent conflict management: refers to institutionalized ways of resolving conflicts between state and citizens without resort to physical violence.</td>
<td>Code of ethics for elected representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring – indicators on the state of the region, annually</td>
<td>Monitoring – indicators on the state of the region, annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good City Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility, transparency, responsiveness: the city bureaucracy should be equally accessible to citizens from all walks of life, transparent in its manner of operation, and responsive to citizens complaints and initiatives.</td>
<td>Formal popular consultation procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness: programs launched to attain specific, politically-sanctioned results should also come close to achieving them. Privatized urban services should be carefully monitored for their compliance with performance standards.</td>
<td>Information flows (media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency: in striving for maximum effectiveness, government-sponsored programs should use resources as efficiently as possible.</td>
<td>Ombudsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty: in carrying out public programs, all concerned parties should be treated fairly, without favouritism. Basically this criterion speaks to the honesty and incorruptibility of public officials</td>
<td>Civil liberties legislation enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For all services, annually:</td>
<td>Complaints office for each department or division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators for outputs</td>
<td>Race-relations boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audits</td>
<td>Conflict resolutions boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of reliability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For all services, annually:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audited accounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit cost calculations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment/ serviced population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption safeguards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-discrimination in providing service, hiring, dealing with people.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong regulatory framework to guide contracting out, partnerships, privatisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Criteria and Evaluation measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good City Outcomes</th>
<th>Evaluation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A *productive city*: provides the right to adequately remunerate work for those who seek it. | Levels of unemployment  
Rate of participation in workforce  
Average wages  
Respect for the informal sector |
| A *sustainable city*: ensures the right to a life-sustaining and life-enhancing natural environment for every citizen, now and in the future. | Indicators of pollution  
Green space  
Ecological protection |
| A *liveable city*: guarantees all citizens their right to decent housing and associated public services, including health and personal safety, in neighbourhoods of their choice. | Housing adequacy, affordability  
Health  
Education |
| A *safe city*: ensures each person’s right to the physical integrity and security of their body | Policing  
Respect for building codes |
| An *actively tolerant city*: protects and promotes citizen rights to group-specific differences in language, religion, national custom, sexual preference, and similar markers of collective identity, so long as these do not invade the rights of others and are consistent with more general human rights. | Anti-discrimination mechanisms  
Citizenship education |
| A *caring city*: acknowledges the right of the weakest members of the polity to adequate social provision. | Indicators for quality, coverage and location of social services (public and non-profit) |

(Friedmann 1998:20)
REFERENCES


